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Abstract
Many successful services rely on trustworthy contribu-
tions from users. To establish that trust, such services of-
ten require access to privacy-sensitive information from
users, thus creating a conflict between privacy and trust.
Although it is likely impractical to expect both absolute
privacy and trustworthiness at the same time, we argue
that the current state of things, where individual privacy
is usually sacrificed at the altar of trustworthy services,
can be improved with a pragmatic Glimmer of Trust,
which allows services to validate user contributions in
a trustworthy way without forfeiting user privacy. We
describe how trustworthy hardware such as Intel’s SGX
can be used client-side – in contrast to much recent work
exploring SGX in cloud services – to realize the Glim-
mer architecture, and demonstrate how this realization is
able to resolve the tension between privacy and trust in a
variety of cases.
1 Privacy and Cloud Services At Odds
More than ever, modern applications and services per-
form computation in a distributed fashion. Driven on one
hand by the broad availability and adoption of cloud ser-
vices, and on the other by the shift to lightweight and
battery-constrained devices as clients, applications usu-
ally feature a rich client backed by sophisticated com-
putation and data storage at a service provider. Aside
from the benefits of performance and energy efficiency,
cloud-backed applications also allow controlled sharing
of information across clients that leads to improved ser-
vices, especially in the era of big-data analytics and ma-
chine learning. For example, a predictive keyboard on
a client device could benefit from a trained machine-
learning model that uses inputs from different users’ key-
boards (Figure 1a). As current topics (such as “the world
series” or “Donald Trump”) trend up – because many
users type them on their keyboards in a short time-span
– an up-to-date model can suggest “Trump” as the next
word when Alice types “Donald”, even if she has never
typed that name herself before. Similar benefits exist for
a wide range of applications, such as image recognition,
recommendation systems and activity detection.
Sadly, sharing of information, especially deeply per-
sonal information such as key clicks, naturally intro-
duces a tussle between information utility and user pri-
vacy. If Alice’s keyboard streams all her key clicks to
a shared, predictive keyboard service, it will almost cer-
tainly reveal sensitive information about her political be-
liefs. This is especially troubling, given that most ser-
vice providers release scant, if any, information about
what precisely they do with information they collect. For
example, Bob’s disparaging remarks enable a malicious
service provider to discriminate against him or aid in
his prosecution. Even if the service provider is well-
meaning, compromising information can be subpoenaed
by the government to persecute Bob, stolen by hackers to
extort him or damage the service brand, or used by reg-
ulatory bodies to slam the service provider with privacy-
violation fines. Therefore, unmediated information shar-
ing is undesirable to users and services alike.
One way to alleviate this tussle is to process user data
at the client, so that it is never disclosed to the service
in the raw [10, 13]. With Federated Machine Learn-
ing [10], for example, every client computes a local par-
tial model, and the service sums those models together
to generate a global one. For example, a simplistic key-
board model in Figure 1b associates a weight between
0 and 1 for an ordered pair of words, without revealing
the actual sentences typed. However, learned models,
even ones much more sophisticated than our strawman
illustration, can still reveal information about the raw in-
puts used to train those models (e.g., machine-learning
models can be inverted [4]). To prevent partial models
from being inverted, users could contribute information
using cryptographic blinding [3] (Figure 1c), or similar
techniques that enable accurate aggregation of a group of
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Figure 1: A predictive keyboard service
inputs while still hiding the individual inputs.
Unfortunately, since these blinding or cryptographic
techniques hide the inputs from the service, they afford
malicious users the ability to contribute forged or ma-
licious inputs undetected, derailing the quality of the
shared service; even if specific validation checks existed
(e.g., range checks, randomness checks, etc.), a client
would have to be entrusted with performing those checks
before hiding the true inputs. For example, Alice could
contribute a blinded local model for her own keyboard
sequences that has been maliciously manipulated to over-
weight her personal political convictions (i.e., contribut-
ing an illegal value of 538 for one model parameter, vio-
lating the valid rage of [0,1]), making it seem extremely
popular beyond what a single user might make it (Fig-
ure 1d). When the service aggregates the blinded local
models together, it cannot detect such induced bias (be-
cause of the blinding), and ends up with a catastrophi-
cally skewed global predictive model towards inaccurate
predictions, degrading the experience of all users. The
only way to range-check Alice’s contribution is before
blinding occurs, but the service cannot trust Alice to do
that faithfully. Even if the actual user contributions are
not themselves private, e.g., users photos associated with
a location on a mapping service, validating those contri-
butions might require access by service code to otherwise
private data (e.g., location tracking through GPS and am-
bient WiFi, to validate that the user did go to a claimed
location) at the device of the very user whose malice the
validation is meant to protect from.
Services affected by this trust-privacy trade-off have
similar characteristics: a) they consume user-contributed
data to build global state benefiting all users, b) ser-
vice quality is highly dependent on the trustworthiness
of data contributed by users, and c) they can only ver-
ify the legitimacy of user contributions through direct ac-
cess to sensitive user data (the contributions themselves,
or contextual user information such as logs and other
user activity). Many of the previously mentioned ser-
vices have these properties. For example, image recog-
nition can benefit from local partial models trained on
the private photos of users, but to verify that contributed
photos are legitimate requires direct access to them be-
fore they are blinded; recommender services learn simi-
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Figure 2: Glimmer Architecture.
larities among products from individual users’ registered
likes, dislikes, and shopping habits, but detecting spuri-
ous reviews requires access to individual users’ purchas-
ing history; activity-recognition models improve from
analyzing silhouettes and image structure from in-home
cameras, but checking that silhouettes are legitimate re-
quires analysis of full video streams captured at people’s
homes. Ultimately, it seems then that trust and privacy in
such services is a zero-sum game – an increase in indi-
vidual privacy results directly in a decrease in the amount
of trust all the users can collectively place in the service.
2 A Glimmer of Trust In Between
To visualize this conundrum between privacy and trust,
we introduce the concept of a Trust Boundary between
the client and the service; no private data should cross
from the client to the service, but the correctness of client
contributions must be checked according to criteria set
by the service on the client’s side. The server cannot es-
tablish trust without access to the private data, but at the
same time the client does not want the server to access
its private data unrestricted.
Such “air-gap” problems can be solved with the in-
troduction of a trusted third party that performs valida-
tion on private client data before submitting user contri-
butions to the service. We call our logical trusted third
party a Glimmer of Trust, or Glimmer for short, since it
performs very limited but essential trusted functionality:
validation of private data as specified by the service, fol-
lowed by submission to the service (Figure 2).
We use the term validation loosely here to capture any
validity predicate entrusted upon the trusted third party;
different validation predicates may trade-off computa-
tional complexity for result accuracy. For example, in
the next-word prediction service, range-checking model
parameters ensures that Alice cannot send a user contri-
bution of 538 when a value between 0 and 1 is expected;
however, she can still send arbitrary fictitious values
within that range that may not correspond to her actual
keyboard activity. A more sophisticated validator might
instead observe actual keyboard behavior (a la NAB [5])
to match keyboard events to reported model weights; or
even observe CPU branches [17] to identify a plausible
execution of the model-construction code that produced
contributed partial results, as has been suggested for on-
line game cheat detection [2]. While more invasive vali-
dation increases the complexity and resources required
by the Glimmer, it also increases the adversary’s cost
to cheat undetected, since she now has to fabricate key-
board activity or program executions that corroborate her
deceptive inputs to the service.
Regardless of the actual validation semantics, the
Glimmer must satisfy certain properties to be helpful.
First, it must guarantee that it discards raw inputs after
processing, and that its outputs leak a bounded amount
of information about private data, via encryption or ag-
gregation (Input Confidentiality). Second, it only en-
dorses for use by the service those contributions that it
has validated (Input Integrity).
Having an actual third party performing the role of
the Glimmer is, arguably, the realization of this archi-
tecture. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), or a consortium of privacy advocacy organiza-
tions could, in ensemble, perform validation and blind-
ing, perhaps using multi-party computation, or simpler
threshold cryptography on inputs. However, the deploy-
ment cost for such a solution would be high. In this
vision paper, we focus on using trustworthy hardware,
because of its current broad availability, as an imple-
mentation platform for Glimmers performing privacy-
preserving user-data validation.
3 Glimmers on SGX
There are several instances of trustworthy hardware com-
monly available on computing clients today, such as Intel
TXT, AMD SVM, ARM TrustZone, and Intel SGX. In
general, all these platforms provide a hardware-enforced
trusted execution environment (TEE), which can execute
functionality isolated from any vulnerabilities or mali-
cious code.
In this position paper we focus on realizing Glimmers
using Intel’s SGX [7]. SGX has spawned renewed in-
terest in trusted computing, with a number of server-side
uses [1, 6, 12]. We are instead studying how SGX can
be used on clients to realize Glimmers of Trust 1. SGX
provides a TEE called an enclave. In addition to isola-
tion, an SGX enclave also supports remote attestation,
which allows it to prove cryptographically to a remote
party that it is running correctly in a legitimate enclave,
and sealed storage, which allows it to encrypt data so
that only it or other designated binaries, running in a le-
gitimate enclave, can decrypt it. Although very power-
1Note that SGX is only available on client-class CPUs.
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Figure 3: SGX Glimmer design
ful, SGX enclaves operate using limited resources, have
no direct access to privileged CPU operations such as IO,
and must mediate system services via the untrusted host
OS. As a result, Glimmers implemented as enclaves must
be simple and run mostly in isolation.
Figure 3 describes the design of an SGX-based Glim-
mer. The Glimmer has 3 main components. A Valida-
tion component takes two types of input from the client
device: user contributions, which will be sent to the ser-
vice and private validation data, which is used internally
by the Glimmer to run the validation predicate. In some
cases, user contributions are used in the validation pred-
icate, while in other cases it will use the private data to
validate the contributions. For example, in the predictive
keyboard service, model parameters are range-checked
against the valid weight range [0,1]. In contrast, more
invasive validation predicates could request additional
data, not contributed to the service, such as individual
key presses and timings or web browser logs showing the
typed data in user-triggered HTTP GET requests to cor-
roborate the user contributions. In the photos for maps,
the Glimmer could request validation information such
as exact GPS location and tracks, a fingerprint of the
camera hardware, and access to other photos on the de-
vice to establish context. Note that the Glimmer cannot
directly obtain such information; it must request this in-
formation from the host system.
Blinding is the second Glimmer component. Its pur-
pose is to hide private, user contributed values so that
the service can compute aggregates on them without re-
vealing individual contributed data. To illustrate how this
could work, we give a simple example [3]. Assume the
existence of a trusted blinding service – which could, it-
self, be implemented as a separate enclave on one of the
clients, or as a distinct trusted service – that computes
N random blinding values pi such that ∑N−1i=0 pi = 0. It
then seals each pi value to the Glimmer code, and en-
crypts one of the sealed values to each of N clients’ pub-
lic keys, distributing the encrypted blinding values to the
Glimmers running on each client. Each Glimmer for user
i can decrypt and unseal its blinding value. The Blinding
component then computes the blinded user contribution
yi = xi+ pi. yi is safe to send to the service, since the ser-
vice cannot compute the private xi from it (because the
blinding value pi is secret). However, once the service
sums all yi’s together, it can compute the accurate sum of
all xi’s: ∑N−1i=0 yi = ∑
N−1
i=0 xi+∑
N−1
i=0 pi = ∑
N−1
i=0 xi. Recall
that non-private user contributions need not be blinded;
for instance, in the crowd-sourced photos for map loca-
tions, user-contributed photos are meant to be shared, so
they do not need to be blinded.
The third Glimmer component, Signing, takes a user-
contributed input (blinded or unblinded) and the result
of the Validation component, which can be a boolean
“valid” / “invalid”, or a confidence value. If vali-
dation passed, the Signing component signs the user-
contributed input and returns it to the client for transmis-
sion to the service. The signing key used can be provided
by the service, and sealed (using the SGX sealing facil-
ity) to the Glimmer code, so that it is only available to
instances of Glimmer enclaves. The signed contributions
are passed back to the client device, which can forward
them to the service.
One last requirement is that the Glimmer convince
both the user and service that it is correct – i.e., that it
has both input confidentiality and integrity properties. To
convince the user, we envision vetting and formal verifi-
cation by a third-party, such as the EFF; while the ser-
vice could perform its own vetting and verification to
convince itself. Once it has been vetted, the hash of the
Glimmer is published, and the user can use SGX to attest
that their client is running the approved Glimmer. Simi-
larly the service can ensure that signing keys are sealed
to the approved Glimmer. Because the Glimmer is, nec-
essarily, small and limited in its external interactions, it
is amenable to formal verification for absence of runtime
errors such as buffer and integer overflows [9, 16]. Fur-
thermore, much research has been recently devoted to
verifying formally the confidentiality of secret values in
SGX enclaves [14, 15]. The burden on programmers is
relatively low: programming in a simple programming
language (e.g., C) with relatively low-complexity idioms
(e.g., bounded loops, no function pointers, etc.), explic-
itly marking secret inputs, explicitly marking declassifi-
cation functions (e.g., blinding and encryption). Simple
functional property verification can establish that every
signed value has been validated and that no private infor-
mation leaves the Glimmer without being blinded.
We have shown all components in Figure 3 within a
single SGX enclave, which is more efficient as there is
only one transition in and out of the enclave. However,
to increase ease of verification, the Glimmer can be de-
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composed so that each component runs in its own en-
clave. Naturally, communication between components
must now also be secured.
4 Glimmer++
4.1 Validation confidentiality
So far, we have described the use of Glimmers in appli-
cations where user contributions are used for a shared
service. However, Glimmers have applications to other
problems where privacy and trust are at odds. For exam-
ple, consider the case of bot detection in a web service.
While CAPTCHAs are a standard method for detecting
bots, they have their drawbacks, such as vulnerability
to computer vision and CAPTCHA farms, and annoy-
ance to legitimate human users. An alternative solution
is embedding a Javascript “detector” in the web page that
heuristically detects whether a bot or a human is present.
Such solutions collect a large set of signals, such as how
faithfully the client executes Javascript, fingerprints of
the client’s system software and hardware, and the timing
and frequency UI interactions such as mouse movements
and changes in focus [5, 11]. These signals are sent back
to the web service, which uses them to determine if the
sender is a bot or a human. However, these signals often
contain private information, such as the user’s cookies,
browsing history and browsing interests [8]. A Glimmer
can protect individual privacy by performing the valida-
tion, which requires access to sensitive information lo-
cally on the client machine, and sending only 1 bit of
information – whether the user is human or not – back to
the web service.
In such an adversarial example, the web service may
wish to hide the exact validation predicate from the ad-
versary, a property we call Validation Confidentiality.
Glimmers can provide validation confidentiality by ac-
cepting encrypted code and data from the web service
and decrypting and running that code inside the enclave
where the plain text code is protected from observation
by the hardware TEE.
One challenge is to make sure that the keys used to
sign and encrypt the code and data are transfered se-
curely to the Glimmer and that the Glimmer only ac-
cepts keys from a legitimate web service. This can be ac-
complished using remote attestation, which enables data,
such as Diffie-Hellman (DH) handshake values, to be
bound to code running in an enclave. This would assert
to the service that the DH handshake is occurring with a
legitimate Glimmer. Similarly, the Glimmer would need
to ensure that the DH handshake is occurring with a legit-
imate service, which can be accomplished by the service
signing its DH handshake values and embedding the sig-
nature verification key in the Glimmer code. Once shared
secrets are negotiated with DH key exchange, secret code
and data can be securely transfered from the service to
the Glimmer.
The other challenge is to prove input confidentiality
to the user when part of the Glimmer can no longer be
audited because it is encrypted and set dynamically at
runtime. This can be done by making the message format
between the Glimmer and the service public, and having
a runtime auditor check that each message is well formed
and contains only one bit of information (i.e., a single
bit plus a well-defined signature and challenge response).
While this does not preclude a covert channel, it puts a
hard upper bound on the capacity of such a channel.
4.2 Glimmer-as-a-service
So far we have proposed that Glimmers run on client de-
vices. However, given the increasing trend towards Inter-
net of things (IoT) devices, there are likely to be some de-
vices that will make user contributions that must be trust-
worthy, but do not have a processor with trusted comput-
ing capabilities. In this case, we envision that a neutral
third party may supply the capability to run a Glimmer.
This third party could simply be another device owned
by the same user (such as a set-top box or home service),
a local group of people that the user knows (such as their
University, community or church), or even a well-known
entity that is willing to sell or provide resources to im-
prove user privacy (such as the EFF).
The main criterion is that the client device needs to
establish that it is sending its private data to a genuine
Glimmer. Fortunately, this can be accomplished us-
ing the same attestation mechanism to establish a se-
cure channel as described above. Attestation enables the
client to be assured that the other endpoint of a secure
communication channel is within an approved Glimmer.
Once this is done, the client can transmit the user con-
tribution and private data and receive in return a signed
(and if necessary, blinded) user contribution, which it can
then forward to the service.
5 Conclusion
We proposed Glimmers of Trust, implemented on trusted
computing hardware, that can provide trustworthiness
guarantees of user-contributed data to services without
compromising user privacy. We describe a design us-
ing Intel SGX, which we are currently implementing.
While many previous proposals for SGX are for server-
side uses [1, 6, 12], or confer mainly server-side benefits
(i.e., DRM, mobile payments), we see Glimmers as one
of the first uses of client-side trusted computing that can
benefit both services and users.
5
Acknowledgements
The ideas presented in this paper were inspired by a num-
ber of preliminary discussions with U´lfar Erlingsson.
References
[1] ARNAUTOV, S., TRACH, B., GREGOR, F., KNAUTH, T., MAR-
TIN, A., PRIEBE, C., LIND, J., MUTHUKUMARAN, D., OTEX-
TQUOTERIGHTKEEFFE, D., STILLWELL, M. L., GOLTZSCHE,
D., EYERS, D., KAPITZA, R., PIETZUCH, P., AND FETZER,
C. SCONE: Secure linux containers with intel SGX. In 12th
USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Imple-
mentation (OSDI 16), USENIX Association, pp. 689–703. bib-
tex: 199364.
[2] BETHEA, D., COCHRAN, R. A., AND REITER, M. K. Server-
side Verification of Client Behavior in Online Games. ACM
Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 14, 4 (Dec. 2008), 32:1–32:27.
[3] BONAWITZ, K., IVANOV, V., KREUTER, B., MARCEDONE, A.,
MCMAHAN, H. B., PATEL, S., RAMAGE, D., SEGAL, A., AND
SETH, K. Practical secure aggregation for federated learning on
user-held data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.04482 (2016).
[4] FREDRIKSON, M., JHA, S., AND RISTENPART, T. Model In-
version Attacks That Exploit Confidence Information and Basic
Countermeasures. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security (New York, NY,
USA, 2015), CCS ’15, ACM, pp. 1322–1333.
[5] GUMMADI, R., BALAKRISHNAN, H., MANIATIS, P., AND RAT-
NASAMY, S. Not-a-Bot: Improving Service Availability in the
Face of Botnet Attacks. In Proceedings of the USENIX Sympo-
sium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (Berke-
ley, CA, USA, 2009), NSDI’09, USENIX Association, pp. 307–
320.
[6] HUNT, T., ZHU, Z., XU, Y., PETER, S., AND WITCHEL, E.
Ryoan: A distributed sandbox for untrusted computation on se-
cret data. In 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems
Design and Implementation (OSDI 16), USENIX Association,
pp. 533–549. bibtex: 199358.
[7] Intel R© Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference,
Oct. 2014. Available at https://software.intel.com/
sites/default/files/managed/48/88/329298-002.pdf.
[8] JANG, D., JHALA, R., LERNER, S., AND SHACHAM, H. An em-
pirical study of privacy-violating information flows in JavaScript
Web applications. In Proceedings of CCS 2010 (Oct. 2010),
A. Keromytis and V. Shmatikov, Eds., ACM Press, pp. 270–83.
[9] KIRCHNER, F., KOSMATOV, N., PREVOSTO, V., SIGNOLES, J.,
AND YAKOBOWSKI, B. Frama-C: A software analysis perspec-
tive. Formal Aspects of Computing 27, 3 (2015), 573–609.
[10] KONECNY´, J., MCMAHAN, H. B., RAMAGE, D., AND
RICHTA´RIK, P. Federated Optimization: Distributed Machine
Learning for On-Device Intelligence. In Proceedings of the NIPS
Workshop on Optimization for Machine Learning (2015).
[11] PARK, K., PAI, V. S., LEE, K.-W., AND CALO, S. B. Securing
web service by automatic robot detection. In USENIX Annual
Technical Conference, General Track, pp. 255–260.
[12] SCHUSTER, F., COSTA, M., FOURNET, C., GKANTSIDIS, C.,
PEINADO, M., MAINAR-RUIZ, G., AND RUSSINOVICH, M.
VC3: Trustworthy data analytics in the cloud using SGX. In
Security and Privacy (SP), 2015 IEEE Symposium on, IEEE,
pp. 38–54.
[13] SHOKRI, R., AND SHMATIKOV, V. Privacy-Preserving Deep
Learning. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security (2015), ACM,
pp. 1310–1321.
[14] SINHA, R., COSTA, M., LAL, A., LOPES, N. P., RAJAMANI,
S., SESHIA, S. A., AND VASWANI, K. A Design and Verifica-
tion Methodology for Secure Isolated Regions. In Proceedings of
the 37th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language
Design and Implementation (New York, NY, USA, 2016), PLDI
’16, ACM, pp. 665–681.
[15] SINHA, R., RAJAMANI, S., SESHIA, S., AND VASWANI, K.
Moat: Verifying Confidentiality of Enclave Programs. In Pro-
ceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (New York, NY, USA, 2015), CCS ’15,
ACM, pp. 1169–1184.
[16] VASUDEVAN, A., CHAKI, S., MANIATIS, P., JIA, L., AND
DATTA, A. u¨berSpark: Enforcing Verifiable Object Abstractions
for Automated Compositional Security Analysis of a Hypervisor.
In USENIX Security Symposium (Austin, TX, 2016), USENIX
Association, pp. 87–104.
[17] VASUDEVAN, A., QU, N., AND PERRIG, A. XTrec: Secure
Real-Time Execution Trace Recording on Commodity Platforms.
In System Sciences (HICSS), 2011 44th Hawaii International
Conference on (2011), IEEE, pp. 1–10.
6
